Employment Law Update seeks to cover a wide range of topics of relevance to employers and HR personnel. In this issue we comment on:
In addition, we update you on the significant legislative changes which have come into force since the start of the year.
If you would like to discuss any of the items included in Employment Law Update or have any other employment law related issues on which you need advice, please get in touch with either Rhona Wark, Partner DD: 0141-285-3803 email r.wark@bellscott.co.uk; or Laurie Anderson, Solicitor: DD 0141-285-3809, email l.anderson@bellscott.co.uk.
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Recent Decisions
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Be clear about termination dates
Mr Radecki, a teacher, was suspended from his post by Kirklees Metropolitan Council, following concerns about his skills and experience. The Council instigated disciplinary proceedings, but these were subsequently put on hold after discussions had taken place about a possible termination of his employment by agreement. The Council drew up a draft compromise agreement stating that it was “without prejudice” and “subject to contract”. The draft agreement also provided that Mr Radecki’s employment would terminate on 31 October 2006. The Council removed Mr Radecki from its payroll on 31 October 2006, however, the compromise agreement was not signed and, in February 2007, Mr Radecki indicated that he was no longer prepared to sign it.
The Council wrote to Mr Radecki on 5 March 2007 informing him that, in accordance with the terms of the draft compromise agreement, his employment had been terminated on 31 October 2006. He disputed this and brought a claim for unfair dismissal, arguing that his employment had terminated on 6 March 2007 – that was the date on which he received the letter from the Council telling him that his employment had been terminated. Termination on this date would have enabled the claim for unfair dismissal to be heard within the statutory time limits.
Mr Radecki had been suspended on full pay for almost a year by the time his employment was terminated. The disciplinary proceedings had been put on hold in the expectation that the parties would be able to reach agreement on the terms of the compromise agreement.
The Court of Appeal decided that by stopping his pay on 31 October 2006, the Council had shown a clear intention to dismiss him. This was sufficient to terminate his employment with effect from that date. Mr Radecki’s unfair dismissal claim was, therefore, out of time, having been lodged after the expiry of the three month time limit for submitting this type of claim.
The court’s decision was not based on the draft compromise agreement, but on the “stopping” of Radecki’s salary. The Court made it clear that the fact that the draft compromise agreement said his employment would terminate on 31 October 2006 was irrelevant. The agreement had never been finalised and, therefore, was not binding on either party. The termination took effect from the point where the pay was stopped, not the date given in the draft agreement.
Laurie Anderson, Solicitor, comments:
The Council was extremely fortunate that Mr Radecki’s unfair dismissal claim was held to be out of time by the Tribunal otherwise it would have been facing a substantial unfair dismissal or constructive unfair dismissal claim.
Employers should ensure that any decision to terminate an employment contract is clearly communicated to the employee. Employers should also take note that, in the absence of a signed compromise agreement, there is nothing to stop an employee presenting an unfair dismissal claim. It is essential, therefore, that any compromise agreement is finalised and signed as quickly as possible.
Additionally, employers must be extremely careful about suspending disciplinary proceedings in the hope of reaching agreement. There must be a long-stop deadline after which negotiations for the compromise agreement will end or, at least, provision made that any tribunal proceedings can resume in parallel.
The decision in this case could quite easily have been good news for Mr Radecki and the Council could have faced a hefty claim for arrears of salary.
Case referred to Kirklees Metropolitan Council v Radecki [ 2009] EWCA Civ 298
A full text of the decision is available on the British and Irish legal Institute website accessible here
Disability discrimination: “normal day-to-day activities” and night shifts
Mr Adams, a policeman in the Dumfries and Galloway force, suffered from ME and found that his symptoms became worse when working on night shifts, particularly between the hours of 2 and 4 a.m.
He joined the force as a constable in November 2005 and was employed until dismissed in February 2007. Soon after starting with the force, he developed various symptoms which included fatigue, weakness and flu-like feelings. In December 2005, his GP diagnosed that ME was a potential cause.
Mr Adams’s work schedule included two night shifts. However, after one month on the schedule, he had difficulty in completing his night shifts. He found that he had to walk slowly, needed assistance or a hand rail to climb stairs and, at times, needed to be driven home and also required help to undress.
From March 2006 until May 2006, Mr Adams was not scheduled to work any night shifts and was free from the ME symptoms during that time. In May 2006, he started on night shifts again and the symptoms returned. On some days, he could not finish his shift. The Constabulary adjusted his night shifts and allowed him to finish early. However, he continued to have problems in the last couple of hours of night shifts and his employment was terminated in February 2007.
Mr Adams brought a claim for disability discrimination which was upheld in the first instance by an Employment Tribunal. The Constabulary appealed the decision without success.
Mr Adams argued that his ME was an impairment that affected his mobility and had an effect on his ability to carry out “normal day-to-day activities” as set out in section 1(1) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA). The tribunal decided that “normal day-to-day activities” included walking, climbing stairs, driving and undressing and that these remained “normal day-to-day activities” when they were being carried out at work between 2 and 4a.m.
In the appeal, the Constabulary argued that these could not be considered to be “normal day-to-day activities” since Mr Adams was only doing them because he was in a specialised job which required him to work at that time of night. Had he not been a policeman, it would be necessary to show that working at that time of day was normal for the majority of the working population.
The appeal tribunal disagreed and said that night shift working is common in the UK, not only among offshore, healthcare and emergency service workers but also, potentially, among hotel workers, haulage drivers and even factory workers. The tribunal was convinced that, even though these workers might not constitute the majority of workers in the UK, there are enough people working night shifts for working between 2 and 4 a.m. to be a “normal day-to-day activity” within the meaning of section 1(1) of the DDA.
Rhona Wark, Partner, comments:
Interesting to note how emphatic the appeal tribunal was on the issue. While there are aspects of a policeman's job that require special skills to execute, the activities, in Mr Adam’s case, were very ordinary and took place at a time of night when there are many other people doing the same type of thing – a logical conclusion, it has to be said.
Case referred to Chief Constable of Dumfries and Galloway [2009] UKEAT 0046 08 0304
A full text of the decision is available on the British and Irish legal Institute website accessible here
Unfettered right of substitution
Mr England Junior and Mr England Senior, a father and son team, worked as self-employed partitioning and ceiling erectors. Between October 2007 and February 2008, they worked exclusively for MPG Contracts Limited which had provided them with written contracts. They submitted invoices to MPG and these were paid by MPG under deduction of tax. MPG set all rates of pay and allocated work to them. The Englands were, during this period of time, subcontracted by MPG to Bovis. Both claimed that they were entitled to holiday pay over the period of the contract and, at an employment tribunal, the issue of whether they were “workers” under the Working Time Regulations had to be considered.
The Employment Rights Act provides that a worker is “an individual who has entered into or works under a contract of employment; or any other contract whether express or implied whereby the individual undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services for any other party to the contract”. The same definition is contained in the Working Time Regulations.
Under the Working Time Regulations, workers are entitled to four weeks annual leave in each year. The DTI guidance on the Regulations clearly states that they do not apply to those who are self-employed, running their own businesses and are free to work for different clients and customers.
At the first hearing, the tribunal decided that both father and son were workers under the Working Time Regulations and entitled to holiday pay. However, the appeal tribunal looked at things differently. It considered that the questions that had to be asked were:
1. Was there a contract to perform work or services?
2. If so, was it a contract to perform that work or those services personally?
This is determined by establishing whether or not there is an unfettered right to provide a substitute in the contract.
3. If there is such a right, were the father and son providing the services in the course of running a business undertaking to MPG as a customer?
The tribunal noted that the right to provide a substitute will not necessarily point to an obligation to provide personal services, there may be a difference where the contractor is unable to do the work as opposed to being “unwilling” to do so. However, in this case, the contract stated that the Englands were free to subcontract work awarded to them subject to MPG being satisfied on the subcontractors’ qualifications and skills. The fact that the subcontractor (the Englands) was free to engage labour to fulfil the contract with MPG was wholly inconsistent with a contract for personal services. This clearly indicated that there was an unfettered right of substitution in the written contract. The appeal tribunal also indicated that you have to look at what happens in practice so as to be sure of the parties’ intentions. Nothing in the implementation of the contract, in the Englands’ case, undermined the right of substitution which they enjoyed. Consequently, the Englands were not workers within the Working Time Regulations and their claim had to be dismissed.
Laurie Anderson, Solicitor, comments
This case serves as a timely reminder about the thorny issue of holiday pay for those working as subcontractors or employing subcontractors. Indeed, it is a timely prompt for everyone to look carefully at contracts engaging subcontractors and their skill level for contracts. Some consideration should be given to whether or not a given subcontractor is required personally for the work or whether any competent tradesman or personnel of skill substituted by it would be sufficient.
Case referred to MPG Contracts Limited v. Mr A England (Junior) Mr A England (Senior) [2009] UKEAT 04880 80 805
A full text of the decision is available on the British and Irish legal Institute website accessible here
Stress claim succeeds on employer’s breach of duty of care
Mrs. Connor, a Headmistress of a Primary School in Surrey, successfully sued her employers, Surrey County Council, for failing to put measures in place to prevent stress leading to her ill health so far as was within its power to do so.
Mrs. Connor joined her school as a Deputy Headmistress in 1994 and was promoted to Headmistress in 1998. She continued in that post until September 2005 when she had to stop working due to ill health. The school was multicultural, but most of the pupils were Muslim. Under Mrs. Connor’s leadership, between 1998 and 2002, the school’s assessment levels improved. In 2003, new members were appointed to the Board of Governors. The conduct of at least two of those new members caused Mrs. Connor considerable problems.
The members causing the problems sought to monopolise meetings with a view to introducing their own agenda which was to increase the role of the Muslim religion in the school. One of the individuals, in particular, made offensive verbal attacks, at meetings, and bombarded Mrs. Connor with numerous requests for information. He made various informal and formal complaints of racism and generally sought to cause difficulties for Mrs. Connor within the local community. A petition against the Headmistress was also circulated by them.
Mrs. Connor brought a claim against Surrey County Council for (1) psychiatric injury caused by negligence; (2) breach of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997; (3) breach of the duty of trust and confidence; and (4) breach of the statutory duty under the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999.
In its decision, the High Court upheld her claim for negligence and awarded her almost £400,000. Following a detailed analysis of the atmosphere and low moral in the school, the High Court held that from June 2004, the Council ought to have considered that Mrs. Connor was at risk of psychiatric injury from stress and that it was its duty to prevent the situation which caused the illness continuing so far it was within its power to do so. There was also specific legislation in place governing the way the school should be governed and authorising the local authority to take action where required - it had failed to use those powers. The Council had been prevented from doing so, in this particular case, due to various delays and misunderstandings over the procedure to be followed and because a decision had been made to set up a mediation and further independent enquiry into the issue. All of these steps had put the necessary intervention on hold and amounted to a disregard for the health and welfare of Mrs. Connor and her staff.
Rhona Wark, Partner, comments:
Whilst work related stress claims always turn on the specific facts in each case and, invariably, require a detailed examination of the circumstances leading up to the illness. This decision should be noted by employers generally for a number of reasons:
1. If the employer has specialist support services available for employees, it must actively consider how to deploy them. Employers need to be aware that simply providing access to these services may not be sufficient. Having access to occupational health services, a consultant to arrange for support or stress counselling is insufficient if an employer fails to act to protect those who are vulnerable.
2. If a stress related harassment claim arises as a result of disagreement between different parties, any employer should take care to ensure that each side’s concerns are investigated.
Here, the Court was not impressed by the employer’s failure to intervene in the affairs of the governing body. This failure stood in marked contrast to the Council’s willingness to act on the various concerns raised by one of the governors in the face of his refusal to participate fully in any of the processes or accept the findings of the reports and enquiries made.
It is also important that employers take care to comply with the principles of “natural justice” when carrying out any report or complaints procedure relating to employee rights. Natural justice requires you to be open and clear about the terms of any enquiry. The report into the school itself was completely and wholly inadequate in that (1) the final enquiry was not disclosed to staff; (2) the scope of the enquiry was extended without any indication of this being given to the witnesses; and (3) the report did not state who the witnesses were or identify what documents had been examined.
The full report of the decision has not been published as yet.
Company charged under the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007
Cotswold Geotechnical Holdings (Cotswold) is the first company in the United Kingdom to be charged with the criminal offence of corporate manslaughter, following the death of an employee killed while taking soil samples from a building site.
If convicted of the offence, Cotswold could face an unlimited fine.
The 2007 Act was introduced to make it more straightforward for the relevant authorities to successfully prosecute organisations where a management failing has led to a death. Under the 2007 Act, an organisation is guilty of an offence if the way in which its activities are managed or organised (by its senior management) causes a person's death. The death must be the result of a gross breach of a relevant duty of care owed by the organisation to the deceased (that is, conduct which falls far below what can reasonably be expected of the organisation in the circumstances).
Commentators expect that this case will be the first of many prosecutions. The construction and engineering sector may be particularly vulnerable, as it accounts for a significant number of work place deaths each year.
Rhona Wark, Partner, comments:
With the threat of prosecution under the Act a reality, it is essential that employers:
- ensure that health and safety leadership within the organisation meets the appropriate standards;
- review safety management systems and consider whether improvements can be made; and
- ensure that the organisation has a health and safety culture, so that everyone takes responsibility for improving health and safety.
In addition, there are a number of employment law considerations which should be borne in mind as a result of the new Act concerning disciplinary, grievance and whistle-blowing procedures.
Employers must have employee disciplinary and grievance procedures. Also, they must use and enforce those procedures in cases involving health and safety. An organisation that has policies and procedures but does not apply them may find that this will influence a jury’s view on the way in which an employer has managed or organised its activities. Strict policies should, therefore, be adopted for the application and enforcement of health and safety disciplinary procedures. Specifically employers must:
- adopt a policy;
- communicate it to all affected (especially the HR Department); and
- set up a system of board reporting to gather feedback on implementation of the policy.
Mirror image policies should also be imposed in connection with grievance procedures. For example, where health and safety issues arise as a part of a grievance, there should be a specific internal requirement that the issue is:
- considered and dealt with by health and safety management; and
- dealt with at a level (board if necessary) commensurate with the risk involved.
Similarly, any whistle-blowing policies should contain specific obligations to involve health and safety management where appropriate. There should be a review of the outcome of procedural cases and action taken and where necessary to change systems, policy and organisational structures. This will be particularly relevant for employers in the construction sector where, by the very nature of their employment, employees are placed at greater risk of injury and death than most other categories of employees.
The scope of the Act is not by any means limited to those employers as the Act applies in cases where certain types of duty of care are owed by an organisation under the law of negligence. Section 2 of the Act states that a duty of care is owed:
- to employees or other persons working for the organisation;
- as an occupier of premises;
- in connection with the supply of goods or services;
- in connection with the carrying out of any other activity on a commercial basis;
- in connection with the carrying out of any construction or maintenance operations;
- in connection with the use or keeping of the organisation of any plant, vehicle or other thing; and
- to persons held in detention or custody (not yet in force).
The effect is wide ranging and all employers should, as a bare minimum take the steps we suggest.
The existing statutory dispute resolution procedures were replaced by the new ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures from 6 April 2009.
The new Code seeks to give practical guidance to employers, employees and their representatives alike and to set down the basic principles for dealing with disciplinary and grievance matters arising in the workplace.
The Code will have substantial impact on both employees and employers. Whilst a failure to adhere to the Code will not, in itself, bring about employment tribunal proceedings, tribunals will take the Code into account when reaching their decisions. Tribunals will also be permitted to adjust awards by up to 25% when the Code has not been complied with. This means that, if an employer unreasonably fails to follow the Code, an award can be increased by up to 25%. This will also mean, however, that if an employee unreasonably fails to follow the Code, his award may be reduced by up to 25%.
The Code sets out the basic requirements of fairness that will be applicable in most disciplinary and grievance cases. It must be noted that the Code will not apply to dismissals due to redundancy or the non-renewal of fixed-term contracts on their expiry.
Some of the key issues in handling disciplinary issues are highlighted in the Code. It is essential to:
The Code also covers key issues regarding grievance issues. The principal grievance procedure considerations are:
The Code does not apply to collective grievances.
The Regulations have been brought in as a result of the repeal of the statutory dispute resolution procedures under the Employment Act 2008.
Parents with children, up to the age of 16, will now be permitted to request flexible working. This extension has been implemented following the recommendations of the “Walsh Review of Flexible Working”.
The Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) (Amendment) Regulations 2008 brings about several changes to the rules and procedures for employment tribunals. The principal changes involve extensions of time in which the respondent to a claim can lodge a response, issuing and reviewing default judgements, extending what action a respondent can take when it is prevented from taking part in proceedings, interim relief and dismissing claims on withdrawal.